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          X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication 
 
Abstract 
 
   X.509 public key certificates use a signature by a trusted 
   certification authority to bind a given public key to a given digital 
   identity.  This document specifies how to use X.509 version 3 public 
   key certificates in public key algorithms in the Secure Shell 
   protocol. 
 
Status of This Memo 
 
   This is an Internet Standards Track document. 
 
   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has 
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the 
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on 
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. 
 
   Information about the current status of this document, any errata, 
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at 
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6187. 
 
Copyright Notice 
 
   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors.  All rights reserved. 
 
   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents 
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must 
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 
   described in the Simplified BSD License. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
   There are two Secure Shell (SSH) protocols that use public key 
   cryptography for authentication.  The Transport Layer Protocol, 
   described in [RFC4253], requires that a digital signature algorithm 
   (called the "public key algorithm") MUST be used to authenticate the 
   server to the client.  Additionally, the User Authentication Protocol 
   described in [RFC4252] allows for the use of a digital signature to 
   authenticate the client to the server ("publickey" authentication). 
 
   In both cases, the validity of the authentication depends upon the 
   strength of the linkage between the public signing key and the 
   identity of the signer.  Digital certificates, such as those in X.509 
   version 3 (X.509v3) format [RFC5280], are used in many corporate and 
   government environments to provide identity management.  They use a 
   chain of signatures by a trusted root certification authority and its 
   intermediate certificate authorities to bind a given public signing 
   key to a given digital identity. 
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   The following public key authentication algorithms are currently 
   available for use in SSH: 
 
                       +--------------+-----------+ 
                       |   Algorithm  | Reference | 
                       +--------------+-----------+ 
                       |    ssh-dss   | [RFC4253] | 
                       |              |           | 
                       |    ssh-rsa   | [RFC4253] | 
                       |              |           | 
                       | pgp-sign-dss | [RFC4253] | 
                       |              |           | 
                       | pgp-sign-rsa | [RFC4253] | 
                       |              |           | 
                       | ecdsa-sha2-* | [RFC5656] | 
                       +--------------+-----------+ 
 
   Since Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) has its own method for binding a 
   public key to a digital identity, this document focuses solely upon 
   the non-PGP methods.  In particular, this document defines the 
   following public key algorithms, which differ from the above solely 
   in their use of X.509v3 certificates to convey the signer's public 
   key. 
 
                         +-----------------------+ 
                         |       Algorithm       | 
                         +-----------------------+ 
                         |     x509v3-ssh-dss    | 
                         |                       | 
                         |     x509v3-ssh-rsa    | 
                         |                       | 
                         | x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 | 
                         |                       | 
                         |  x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*  | 
                         +-----------------------+ 
 
   Public keys conveyed using the x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-* public key 
   algorithms can be used with the ecmqv-sha2 key exchange method. 
 
   Implementation of this specification requires familiarity with the 
   Secure Shell protocol [RFC4251] [RFC4253] and X.509v3 certificates 
   [RFC5280].  Data types used in describing protocol messages are 
   defined in Section 5 of [RFC4251]. 
 
   This document is concerned with SSH implementation details; 
   specification of the underlying cryptographic algorithms and the 
   handling and structure of X.509v3 certificates is left to other 
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   standards documents, particularly [RFC3447], [FIPS-186-3], 
   [FIPS-180-2], [FIPS-180-3], [SEC1], and [RFC5280]. 
 
   An earlier proposal for the use of X.509v3 certificates in the Secure 
   Shell protocol was introduced by O. Saarenmaa and J. Galbraith; while 
   this document is informed in part by that earlier proposal, it does 
   not maintain strict compatibility. 
 
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 
 
2.  Public Key Algorithms Using X.509 Version 3 Certificates 
 
   This document defines the following new public key algorithms for use 
   in the Secure Shell protocol: x509v3-ssh-dss, x509v3-ssh-rsa, 
   x509v3-rsa2048-sha256, and the family of algorithms given by 
   x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*.  In these algorithms, a public key is stored in 
   an X.509v3 certificate.  This certificate, a chain of certificates 
   leading to a trusted certificate authority, and optional messages 
   giving the revocation status of the certificates are sent as the 
   public key data in the Secure Shell protocol according to the format 
   in this section. 
 
2.1.  Public Key Format 
 
   The reader is referred to [RFC5280] for a general description of 
   X.509 version 3 certificates.  For the purposes of this document, it 
   suffices to know that in X.509 a chain or sequence of certificates 
   (possibly of length one) allows a trusted root certificate authority 
   and its intermediate certificate authorities to cryptographically 
   bind a given public key to a given digital identity using public key 
   signatures. 
 
   For all of the public key algorithms specified in this document, the 
   key format consists of a sequence of one or more X.509v3 certificates 
   followed by a sequence of 0 or more Online Certificate Status 
   Protocol (OCSP) responses as in Section 4.2 of [RFC2560].  Providing 
   OCSP responses directly in this data structure can reduce the number 
   of communication rounds required (saving the implementation from 
   needing to perform OCSP checking out-of-band) and can also allow a 
   client outside of a private network to receive OCSP responses from a 
   server behind a firewall.  As with any use of OCSP data, 
   implementations SHOULD check that the production time of the OCSP 
   response is acceptable.  It is RECOMMENDED, but not REQUIRED, that 
   implementations reject certificates for which the certificate status 
   is revoked. 
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   The key format has the following specific encoding: 
 
     string  "x509v3-ssh-dss" / "x509v3-ssh-rsa" / 
             "x509v3-rsa2048-sha256" / "x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-[identifier]" 
     uint32  certificate-count 
     string  certificate[1..certificate-count] 
     uint32  ocsp-response-count 
     string  ocsp-response[0..ocsp-response-count] 
 
   In the figure above, the string [identifier] is the identifier of the 
   elliptic curve domain parameters.  The format of this string is 
   specified in Section 6.1 of [RFC5656].  Information on the REQUIRED 
   and RECOMMENDED sets of elliptic curve domain parameters for use with 
   this algorithm can be found in Section 10 of [RFC5656]. 
 
   Each certificate and ocsp-response MUST be encoded as a string of 
   octets using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding of 
   Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [ASN1].  An example of an SSH 
   key exchange involving one of these public key algorithms is given in 
   Appendix A. 
 
   Additionally, the following constraints apply: 
 
   o  The sender's certificate MUST be the first certificate and the 
      public key conveyed by this certificate MUST be consistent with 
      the public key algorithm being employed to authenticate the 
      sender. 
 
   o  Each following certificate MUST certify the one preceding it. 
 
   o  The self-signed certificate specifying the root authority MAY be 
      omitted.  All other intermediate certificates in the chain leading 
      to a root authority MUST be included. 
 
   o  To improve the chances that a peer can verify certificate chains 
      and OCSP responses, individual certificates and OCSP responses 
      SHOULD be signed using only signature algorithms corresponding to 
      public key algorithms supported by the peer, as indicated in the 
      server_host_key_algorithms field of the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet 
      (see Section 7.1 of [RFC4253]).  However, other algorithms MAY be 
      used.  The choice of signature algorithm used by any given 
      certificate or OCSP response is independent of the signature 
      algorithms chosen by other elements in the chain. 
 
   o  Verifiers MUST be prepared to receive certificate chains and OCSP 
      responses that use algorithms not listed in the 
      server_host_key_algorithms field of the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet, 
      including algorithms that potentially have no Secure Shell 
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      equivalent.  However, peers sending such chains should recognize 
      that such chains are more likely to be unverifiable than chains 
      that use only algorithms listed in the server_host_key_algorithms 
      field. 
 
   o  There is no requirement on the ordering of OCSP responses.  The 
      number of OCSP responses MUST NOT exceed the number of 
      certificates. 
 
   Upon receipt of a certificate chain, implementations MUST verify the 
   certificate chain according to Section 6.1 of [RFC5280] based on a 
   root of trust configured by the system administrator or user. 
 
   Issues associated with the use of certificates (such as expiration of 
   certificates and revocation of compromised certificates) are 
   addressed in [RFC5280] and are outside the scope of this document. 
   However, compliant implementations MUST comply with [RFC5280]. 
   Implementations providing and processing OCSP responses MUST comply 
   with [RFC2560]. 
 
   When no OCSP responses are provided, it is up to the implementation 
   and system administrator to decide whether or not to accept the 
   certificate.  It may be possible for the implementation to retrieve 
   OCSP responses based on the id-ad-ocsp access description in the 
   certificate's Authority Information Access data (Section 4.2.2.1 of 
   [RFC5280]).  However, if the id-ad-ocsp access description indicates 
   that the certificate authority employs OCSP, and no OCSP response 
   information is available, it is RECOMMENDED that the certificate be 
   rejected. 
 
   [RFC5480] and [RFC5758] describe the structure of X.509v3 
   certificates to be used with Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
   Algorithm (ECDSA) public keys.  [RFC3279] and [RFC5280] describe the 
   structure of X.509v3 certificates to be used with RSA and Digital 
   Signature Algorithm (DSA) public keys.  [RFC5759] provides additional 
   guidance for ECDSA keys in Suite B X.509v3 certificate and 
   certificate revocation list profiles. 
 
2.2.  Certificate Extensions 
 
   Certificate extensions allow for the specification of additional 
   attributes associated with a public key in an X.509v3 certificate 
   (see Section 4.2 of [RFC5280]).  The KeyUsage and ExtendedKeyUsage 
   extensions may be used to restrict the use of X.509v3 certificates in 
   the context of the Secure Shell protocol as specified in the 
   following sections. 
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2.2.1.  KeyUsage 
 
   The KeyUsage extension MAY be used to restrict a certificate's use. 
   In accordance with Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280], if the KeyUsage 
   extension is present, then the certificate MUST be used only for one 
   of the purposes indicated.  There are two relevant keyUsage 
   identifiers for the certificate corresponding to the public key 
   algorithm in use: 
 
   o  If the KeyUsage extension is present in a certificate for the 
      x509v3-ssh-dss, x509v3-ssh-rsa, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256, or x509v3- 
      ecdsa-sha2-* public key algorithms, then the digitalSignature bit 
      MUST be set. 
 
   o  If the KeyUsage extension is present in a certificate for the 
      ecmqv-sha2 key exchange method, then the keyAgreement bit MUST be 
      set. 
 
   For the remaining certificates in the certificate chain, 
   implementations MUST comply with existing conventions on KeyUsage 
   identifiers and certificates as in Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]. 
 
2.2.2.  ExtendedKeyUsage 
 
   This document defines two ExtendedKeyUsage key purpose IDs that MAY 
   be used to restrict a certificate's use: id-kp-secureShellClient, 
   which indicates that the key can be used for a Secure Shell client, 
   and id-kp-secureShellServer, which indicates that the key can be used 
   for a Secure Shell server.  In accordance with Section 4.2.1.12 of 
   [RFC5280], if the ExtendedKeyUsage extension is present, then the 
   certificate MUST be used only for one of the purposes indicated.  The 
   object identifiers of the two key purpose IDs defined in this 
   document are as follows: 
 
   o  id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } 
 
   o  id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } -- extended key purpose 
      identifiers 
 
   o  id-kp-secureShellClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 21 } 
 
   o  id-kp-secureShellServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 22 } 
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3.  Signature Encoding 
 
   Signing and verifying using the X.509v3-based public key algorithms 
   specified in this document (x509v3-ssh-dss, x509v3-ssh-rsa, 
   x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*) is done in the analogous way for the 
   corresponding non-X.509v3-based public key algorithms (ssh-dss, 
   ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-*, respectively); the x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 
   public key algorithm provides a new mechanism, similar to ssh-rsa, 
   but has a different hash function and additional key size 
   constraints.  For concreteness, we specify this explicitly below. 
 
3.1.  x509v3-ssh-dss 
 
   Signing and verifying using the x509v3-ssh-dss key format is done 
   according to the Digital Signature Standard [FIPS-186-3] using the 
   SHA-1 hash [FIPS-180-2]. 
 
   The resulting signature is encoded as follows: 
 
     string  "ssh-dss" 
     string  dss_signature_blob 
 
   The value for dss_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing r, 
   followed by s (which are fixed-length 160-bit integers, without 
   lengths or padding, unsigned, and in network byte order). 
 
   This format is the same as for ssh-dss signatures in Section 6.6 of 
   [RFC4253]. 
 
3.2.  x509v3-ssh-rsa 
 
   Signing and verifying using the x509v3-ssh-rsa key format is 
   performed according to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme in [RFC3447] 
   using the SHA-1 hash [FIPS-180-2]. 
 
   The resulting signature is encoded as follows: 
 
     string  "ssh-rsa" 
     string  rsa_signature_blob 
 
   The value for rsa_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing s 
   (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in 
   network byte order). 
 
   This format is the same as for ssh-rsa signatures in Section 6.6 of 
   [RFC4253]. 
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3.3.  x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 
 
   Signing and verifying using the x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 key format is 
   performed according to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme in [RFC3447] 
   using the SHA-256 hash [FIPS-180-3]; RSA keys conveyed using this 
   format MUST have a modulus of at least 2048 bits. 
 
   The resulting signature is encoded as follows: 
 
     string  "rsa2048-sha256" 
     string  rsa_signature_blob 
 
   The value for rsa_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing s 
   (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in 
   network byte order). 
 
   Unlike the other public key formats specified in this document, the 
   x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 public key format does not correspond to any 
   previously existing SSH non-certificate public key format.  The main 
   purpose of introducing this public key format is to provide an RSA- 
   based public key format that is compatible with current 
   recommendations on key size and hash functions.  For example, 
   National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's) draft 
   recommendations on cryptographic algorithms and key lengths 
   [SP-800-131] specify that digital signature generation using an RSA 
   key with modulus less than 2048 bits or with the SHA-1 hash function 
   is acceptable through 2010 and deprecated from 2011 through 2013, 
   whereas an RSA key with modulus at least 2048 bits and SHA-256 is 
   acceptable for the indefinite future.  The introduction of other non- 
   certificate-based SSH public key formats compatible with the above 
   recommendations is outside the scope of this document. 
 
3.4.  x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-* 
 
   Signing and verifying using the x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-* key formats is 
   performed according to the ECDSA algorithm in [FIPS-186-3] using the 
   SHA2 hash function family [FIPS-180-3].  The choice of hash function 
   from the SHA2 hash function family is based on the key size of the 
   ECDSA key as specified in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC5656]. 
 
   The resulting signature is encoded as follows: 
 
     string  "ecdsa-sha2-[identifier]" 
     string  ecdsa_signature_blob 
 
   The string [identifier] is the identifier of the elliptic curve 
   domain parameters.  The format of this string is specified in Section 
   6.1 of [RFC5656]. 
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   The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: 
 
     mpint   r 
     mpint   s 
 
   The integers r and s are the output of the ECDSA algorithm. 
 
   This format is the same as for ecdsa-sha2-* signatures in Section 
   3.1.2 of [RFC5656]. 
 
4.  Use in Public Key Algorithms 
 
   The public key algorithms and encodings defined in this document 
   SHOULD be accepted any place in the Secure Shell protocol suite where 
   public keys are used, including, but not limited to, the following 
   protocol messages for server authentication and user authentication: 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message when "publickey" 
      authentication is used [RFC4252] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message when "hostbased" 
      authentication is used [RFC4252] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY message [RFC4253] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY message [RFC4432] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message [RFC4462] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY message [RFC5656] 
 
   o  in the SSH_MSG_KEX_ECMQV_REPLY message [RFC5656] 
 
   When a public key from this specification is included in the input to 
   a hash algorithm, the exact bytes that are transmitted on the wire 
   must be used as input to the hash functions.  In particular, 
   implementations MUST NOT omit any of the chain certificates or OCSP 
   responses that were included on the wire, nor change encoding of the 
   certificate or OCSP data.  Otherwise, hashes that are meant to be 
   computed in parallel by both peers will have differing values. 
 
   For the purposes of user authentication, the mapping between 
   certificates and user names is left as an implementation and 
   configuration issue for implementers and system administrators. 
 
   For the purposes of server authentication, it is RECOMMENDED that 
   implementations support the following mechanism mapping host names to 
   certificates.  However, local policy MAY disable the mechanism or MAY 
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   impose additional constraints before considering a matching 
   successful.  Furthermore, additional mechanisms mapping host names to 
   certificates MAY be used and are left as implementation and 
   configuration issues for implementers and system administrators. 
 
   The RECOMMENDED server authentication mechanism is as follows.  The 
   subjectAlternativeName X.509v3 extension, as described in Section 
   4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280], SHOULD be used to convey the server host name, 
   using either dNSName entries or iPAddress entries to convey domain 
   names or IP addresses as appropriate.  Multiple entries MAY be 
   specified.  The following rules apply: 
 
   o  If the client's reference identifier (e.g., the host name typed by 
      the client) is a DNS domain name, the server's identity SHOULD be 
      checked using the rules specified in [RFC6125].  Support for the 
      DNS-ID identifier type is RECOMMENDED in client and server 
      software implementations.  Certification authorities that issue 
      certificates for use by Secure Shell servers SHOULD support the 
      DNS-ID identifier type.  Service providers SHOULD include the 
      DNS-ID identifier type in certificate requests.  The DNS-ID MAY 
      contain the wildcard character '*' as the complete left-most label 
      within the identifier. 
 
   o  If the client's reference identifier is an IP address as defined 
      by [RFC0791] or [RFC2460], the client SHOULD convert that address 
      to the "network byte order" octet string representation and 
      compare it against a subjectAltName entry of type iPAddress.  A 
      match occurs if the octet strings are identical for the reference 
      identifier and any presented identifier. 
 
5.  Security Considerations 
 
   This document provides new public key algorithms for the Secure Shell 
   protocol that convey public keys using X.509v3 certificates.  For the 
   most part, the security considerations involved in using the Secure 
   Shell protocol apply, since all of the public key algorithms 
   introduced in this document are based on existing algorithms in the 
   Secure Shell protocol.  However, implementers should be aware of 
   security considerations specific to the use of X.509v3 certificates 
   in a public key infrastructure, including considerations related to 
   expired certificates and certificate revocation lists. 
 
   The reader is directed to the security considerations sections of 
   [RFC5280] for the use of X.509v3 certificates, [RFC2560] for the use 
   of OCSP response, [RFC4253] for server authentication, and [RFC4252] 
   for user authentication.  Implementations SHOULD NOT use revoked 
   certificates because many causes of certificate revocation mean that 
   the critical authentication properties needed are no longer true. 
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   For example, compromise of a certificate's private key or issuance of 
   a certificate to the wrong party are common reasons to revoke a 
   certificate. 
 
   If a party to the SSH exchange attempts to use a revoked X.509v3 
   certificate, this attempt along with the date, time, certificate 
   identity, and apparent origin IP address of the attempt SHOULD be 
   logged as a security event in the system's audit logs or the system's 
   general event logs.  Similarly, if a certificate indicates that OCSP 
   is used and there is no response to the OCSP query, the absence of a 
   response along with the details of the attempted certificate use (as 
   before) SHOULD be logged. 
 
   As with all specifications involving cryptographic algorithms, the 
   quality of security provided by this specification depends on the 
   strength of the cryptographic algorithms in use, the security of the 
   keys, the correctness of the implementation, and the security of the 
   public key infrastructure and the certificate authorities. 
   Accordingly, implementers are encouraged to use high-assurance 
   methods when implementing this specification and other parts of the 
   Secure Shell protocol suite. 
 
6.  IANA Considerations 
 
   Consistent with Section 8 of [RFC4251] and Section 4.6 of [RFC4250], 
   this document makes the following registrations: 
 
   In the Public Key Algorithm Names registry: 
 
   o  The SSH public key algorithm "x509v3-ssh-dss". 
 
   o  The SSH public key algorithm "x509v3-ssh-rsa". 
 
   o  The SSH public key algorithm "x509v3-rsa2048-sha256". 
 
   o  The family of SSH public key algorithm names beginning with 
      "x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-" and not containing the at-sign ('@'). 
 
   The two object identifiers used in Section 2.2.2 were assigned from 
   an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX Working Group. 
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Appendix A.  Example 
 
   The following example illustrates the use of an X.509v3 certificate 
   for a public key for the Digital Signature Algorithm when used in a 
   Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.  In the example, there is a chain 
   of certificates of length 2, and a single OCSP response is provided. 
 
     byte    SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 
     string  0x00 0x00 0xXX 0xXX  -- length of the remaining data in 
                                     this string 
             0x00 0x00 0x00 0x0D  -- length of string "x509v3-ssh-dss" 
             "x509v3-ssh-dss" 
             0x00 0x00 0x00 0x02  -- there are 2 certificates 
             0x00 0x00 0xXX 0xXX  -- length of sender certificate 
             DER-encoded sender certificate 
             0x00 0x00 0xXX 0xXX  -- length of issuer certificate 
             DER-encoded issuer certificate 
             0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01  -- there is 1 OCSP response 
             0x00 0x00 0xXX 0xXX  -- length of OCSP response 
             DER-encoded OCSP response 
     mpint   f 
     string  signature of H 
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